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Until April 1999, when it published a draft called Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: General Principles ("General Principles"), the
American Law Institute ("ALI") had never purported to declare the
"general principles" of anything.' This lack of precedent meant a
blank slate: Reporters can carry out a general-principles mandate
in varying ways. One contributor to this Conference, David Owen,
has spoken elsewhere of "paths taken and untaken in the Restate-
ment (Third)" to describe choices about products liability rules.2
Professor Owen has perceived these divergences as wide and pro-
found. 3 In the General Principles, which strive to speak about all of
Torts rather than just one category of doctrine, options "taken and
untaken" present an even wider array.
Because the General Principles are in flux, I should specify
that in this Essay I address two particular publications in the ALI
archive: 4 the Discussion Draft of April, 1999, prepared by Professor
Gary Schwartz, and Preliminary Draft No. 2, dated May 10, 2000,
which in turn contains a chapter on strict liability by Professor
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Discussion Draft]. The Institute prefers instead to distill judge-made law on discrete
points into blackletter and commentary, often commending one solution or another to questions
on which American courts are divided. For a description of the Institute's work, see
http://www.ali.org.
In a private conversation with me in 1999, Gary Schwartz related his view that the Model
Penal Code was in effect a restatement of the general principles of criminal law. I agree that it
is relevant. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83 (discussing origin, philosophy, and content
of the Model Penal Code); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and
Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1153-54
(2001) (contending that Schwartz's portion of the General Principles evinces too much fidelity to
the Model Penal Code precedent). One might also contend that the Uniform Commercial Code,
co-sponsored by the ALI, started its life as a restatement of general principles, even though its
founder, Karl Llewellyn, specifically asserted that the UCC should be understood as inchoate or
"semi-permanent," to be read together with evolving new case law. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1978);
see also Shael Herman, The Fate and Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
407, 433 n.88 (1996) (pointing out that the UCC now covers decades' worth of new topics, such as
the law of electronic transfers; this temporal swath suggests that the UCC does not encompass
one set of general principles).
2. David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in
the Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (1994).
3. Id. at 1241.
4. The Institute maintains archives containing all published drafts and related materials.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1146 n.64.
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Schwartz and a document called Supplemental Materials by Profes-
sor Harvey Perlman.5 Soon after the May publication, the General
Principles project took several turns, including personnel shifts and
rethinkings of the endeavor within the ALI.6 Perhaps most signifi-
cant for purposes of this Essay, a new title has emerged for the
project: Shortly before my final deadline, Schwartz's portion became
"Liability for Physical Harm: Basic Principles." 7 Despite this tem-
pest of change and the far-from-final status of the Discussion Draft
and the Supplemental Materials, these documents remain of inter-
est. They reflect both process and result of an unprecedented en-
deavor to restate the general principles of Torts. And so two pieces
from the General Principles collection, which lay out paths that are
at the moment simultaneously "taken and untaken in the Restate-
ment (Third)," warrant attention here. In recognition of their con-
tinuing vitality, I speak of them in this Essay using the present
tense.
My claim is that the General Principles look at Torts from a
gendered perspective: mostly (but far from uniformly) male, an out-
come consistent with the overrepresentation of men in all sectors
that build the doctrine and theory of Torts. Some readers of the
General Principles have reached the same conclusion by means that
are different from mine. For example, one key assertion in the Dis-
cussion Draft declares emotional or dignitary injury peripheral to
Torts; its corollary, that physical injury is both paradigmatic and
preemptive, has troubled Martha Ohamallas.8  To Professor
Chamallas, principles that deny the centrality of emotion and dig-
5. Schwartz's draft is Discussion Draft, supra note 1. In a later ALI publication. Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 2, Schwartz updates the strict liability chapter. RESTATE.MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES §§18-23 (Preliminary Draft No. 2 May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft No. 2]. Perlman's draft is Council Draft No. 2 and also appears in Preliminary Draft No. 2.
Id. §§ 2A-9A, 101-05. The Perlman document has been shelved at the ALI. Telephone Conversa-
tion with Lance Liebman, Director, American Law Institute (Dec. 20, 2000). Variations between
Preliminary Draft No. 2 and Council Draft No. 2 are not pertinent to this Essay.
6. Telephone Conversation with Lance Liebman, Director, American Law Institute (Dec.
20, 2000) (discussing the ALI rethinking). After circulating the Supplemental Materials, Profes-
sor Perlman became Interim Chancellor of the University of Nebraska, thereby acquiring exten-
sive new duties conflicting with those he held as co-Reporter. Another occasion of significance
was the naming of Professor Michael Green as co-Reporter.
7. E-mail from Diana Hansen, American Law Institute, to Anita Bernstein, Professor of
Law, Emory University (Dec. 20, 2000) (on file with author). For further discussion of this point,
see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
8. For this statement, see Discussion Draft, supra note 1, atxxi C'Given the projects 'gen-
erar interests, [it] does not itself consider liability for emotional distress or economic loss"). See
also supra text accompanying note 7 (noting subsequent title change to "Liability for Physical
Harms").
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nity within tort law are not general after all, but exclusionary and
dismissivef
By contrast I find maleness in the formation of this compen-
dium itself. The belief that it is desirable to describe the essence of
one subject in one comprehensive, rationalist, universal, and gen-
eral compilation descends from forebears of the seventeenth cen-
tury who strove to penetrate what they perceived as a recumbent,
mysterious, passive, and decidedly feminine wilderness of Nature.
Although scholars have for centuries been calling these precedents
gendered, 10 writers who assert general principles usually do not see
themselves as carrying a masculine torch. The endeavor regards
itself as driven by observation rather than ideology, following the
posture, associated with Francis Bacon, of stepping back to gaze on
apparent disorder as a method of educing truth.
Applied to the General Principles, the premise is that once
accurately perceived, an object of gaze-for the ALI mainly deci-
sional law, with statutes and scholarship occasionally included 11-
will reveal its inner logic and coherence. Such a stance, I argue, mis-
describes the work of restaters; in my view, they are more political
intervenors than detached, neutral onlookers. In the name of disin-
terested examination, the prescription of masculine order sup-
presses alternatives, and forces that which it sees into a Procrus-
tean framework. An individual restater may sincerely believe that
conclusions derive strictly from the material he observes, but
choices are in play.
To develop this argument, Part I begins by propounding
what I call Alternative Principles, descriptive assertions about
American tort law that are not found in the General Principles. Al-
though they look different from the principles that Schwartz and
Perlman have put forth, these Alternative Principles do not in form
or substance violate any canon of Restatement draftsmanship. 12 In
9. E.g., Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54
VAND. L. REV. 751, 752-53, 761 (2001).
10. See infra Part II.
11. Scholars disagree on which materials ought to go into the Restatement mix. See gener-
ally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Restatement (Third) Prod-
uct Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667-68 (1998) (noting strife over what consti-
tutes "politics" in the selection of Restatement sources); cf. Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement,
61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (1994) (contending that a rule should not be installed into a Re-
statement unless it enjoys significant acceptance within state case law).
12. According to eminent authorities, such canons may not exist. In this volume Professors
Henderson and Twerski, co-Reporters of the first part of the Restatement (Third), propose what
they call "A Short Primer of Do's and Don'es For Drafting Restatement Black Letter," Henderson
[Vol. 54:3:13671370
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my opinion they are also accurate and useful, although I will not
strain to support that contention. Instead I invite readers to con-
sider on what basis the Alternative Principles can be irregular or
unacceptable, given the tabula rasa on which the General Principles
were written. Part II elaborates on the idea of a gendered universal,
whereby order is supposed to emerge from observation, and disor-
der-Nature, or the feminine-is posited out. Using the term "re-
statements" to extend beyond ALI-published compendia, Part III
links the General Principles with other restatements that have also
asserted a similar prescription. Part IV invokes the work of numer-
ous eminent jurists-including the Reporters who wrote the draft
General Principles-as contrary to this prescriptive stance, sug-
gesting that a strong contrary tradition, not just isolated feminist
dissent, stands opposed to the prescription of masculine order.
I. WHAT IS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE?
Feminist approaches to traditional disciplines have often
sought to point out what is omitted or neglected in canonical work.
The venture becomes perilous when readers misinterpret such dec-
larations as flat-out attacks on the material studied. 3 I intend no
attack on the General Principles. My reading of what is excluded
and included in the General Principles is extended instead to ex-
plore the question of how to classify propositions as either suited or
not suited to Restatements, and the implications of this classifica-
tion. Toward this end, I propose six Alternative Principles, and then
explore what makes them different from the General Principles.
& Twerski, supra note 1, at 1145-48, but acknowledge that heretofore "published guidance for
drafting Restatements [was] not to be found." Id. at 145.
13. Susan Bordo notes that a stereotype regards feminist thought as,
male hating and canon bashing. So, for example, when feminists criticize ex-
isting models of reason (engaging in a critical, reconstructive project that has
occupied male philosophers from Aristotle and Hegel to James, Dewey, and
Whitehead), it is sometimes read as an all-out attack on rationality or as an
"assault on reason"--creating the image of Lorena Bobbit [sic]-like viragos,
heading at the canon with their sharpened steak knives.
Susan Bordo, Introduction to FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF REN- DESCARTES 1, 3 (Susan
Bordo ed., 1999).
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A. Some Omissions from the General Principles: Alternative
Principles
1. Citizen Initiative and Expressions Build Law
A tort action begins with the citizen-initiated complaint. 14
Only convention, no longer any formal common-law requirement,
compels a plaintiff to fit her story into a familiar label like "battery"
or "nuisance."'15 This latitude distinguishes Torts from numerous
other legal classifications, in private as well as public law. For in-
stance contract law, another subject shaped by citizen initiative,
restricts plaintiffs by requiring them to identify something resem-
bling an agreement in all cases. But the category called Torts speci-
fies little more than grievances. 16 A person can demand legal re-
dress for a wrong even if the legislature and all other relevant po-
litical institutions have never considered the wrongness of any con-
duct described, or the category into which it might fall.17
The modern plaintiff will often evaluate her injury under the
influence of Torts concepts, '8 but she has long been free to prosecute
her claim on her own terms. The great ancestor of modern Torts
doctrine, trespass, first identified non-contractual legal wrongs as
breaches of the king's peace. For centuries following the Norman
Conquest, plaintiffs had to allege a transgression that included vi et
armis, or force and violence, in order to obtain this writ, which gave
14. See Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 44-47 (2000).
15. See JOHN W. WADE, VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT,
PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASE AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 6 (9th ed. 1994) ("Although we
no longer have 'forms of action,' it usually is helpful from the vantage point of advocacy to place
one's claim under a tort 'label' that will be familiar to the court.. ").
16. Not everything goes, as I have remarked elsewhere. See generally Anita Bernstein, How
to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997) (noting that new tort causes
of action are hard for plaintiffs to form). Here I am adverting only to the paucity of formal re-
quirements that are necessary to initiate an action, which suggests that the complaint itself is
relatively central.
17. A demand is a far cry from a victory. Civil-procedure rules raise the first formal obsta-
cle by permitting defendants to seek dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Judges also are free to reject complaints before adjudicating them on the
merits. The plaintiffs freedom to complain, however, exists independent of these opportunities,
and also of the merits of the complaint.
18. For example, Gary Schwartz has pointed out that not every society that affords citizens
medical care recognizes the existence of "whiplash" as a medical condition, even though Ameri-
can physicians think of it as a distinct clinical phenomenon. Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault
and First-Party Insurance, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 635 n.102 (2000) (citing Harald Schrador ot
al., Natural Evolution of Late Whiplash Syndrome Outside of the Medicolegal Context, LANCET,
May 4, 1996, at 347 (noting that whiplash appears unknown in Lithuania)).
1372 [Vol. 54:3:1367
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them access to the royal courts.19 This vision of wrongs understood
injuries in terms of public order. Gradually, however, tort law
turned away from the king's peace into the remediation of personal
injuries, first by liberalizing the trespass writ to include indirect
application of force (made actionable via the writ of "trespass on the
case"20) and then by retreating from the forms of action in favor of
code-based procedure. 21 Without much deference to fixed doctrine, a
plaintiff today can press her initiative on the courts.
The injured person has some key partners, also citizens,
whose initiative is encouraged. American courts stay relatively
open with the help of provisions like contingency fees, due-process
and equal-protection guarantees in state constitutions that have
been used to invalidate pro-defense tort reform legislation, and the
rule that losers do not usually reimburse winners for their litiga-
tion expenses. Academic commentators, most famously Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis, occasionally assert new rights that
warrant judicial enforcement. 22 An ingenious and aggressive plain-
tiffs' bar can come up with new ideas about expanded liability, such
as the notion that cigarette manufacturers owe state governments
recompense for having caused physical injury to smokers. 23 Most of
these participants do not work for the government and thus can be
counted among the citizens whose initiative changes tort law. The
hungry litigator trying to earn a living, the injured consumer, the
parent of a disabled child, the physician who decides to work in fo-
rensics-tort law welcomes them all, as architects and builders.
Tort law thus has a good claim to a place in the center of the
"storytelling" genre. Although not inclined to accept the veracity or
relevance of anyone's story-the plaintiff shoulders the burden of
proof, after all-Torts maintains as its starting point the unique,
subjective, partisan narrative.2 4 Because academic debate on the
virtues and hazards of storytelling in the legal system has tended to
19. See MoRRIS ARNOLD, SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS 1307-99
(1985).
20. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 25-26 (2000).
21. VADE ET AL., supra note 15, at 6.
22. I refer to the landmark article on privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article has generated a large secondary
literature. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE NV. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991). See generally Bernstein, supra note 16, at
1555-63 (recounting other efforts by academic writers to declare new torts).
23. See DAN ZEGART, CIVL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INmUSTRY 92
(2000) (describing how a Mississippi litigator advanced this idea in 1993).
24. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 139,
140 (1996) (In tort litigation, a plaintiff "tells her own story, not someone else's story .... Like-
wise, the defendant tells its story.").
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focus on the content of stories rather than the fact of their exis-
tence, Torts has not seemed central to this literature;25 but without
stories there would never have been any tort law.
2. Professionals Share Authority With Non-Professionals
As we have just noted, many different categories of citizens
help to build tort law in their roles as onlookers and advocates.
Plaintiffs counsel, expert witnesses, and academic commentators
influence the outcome of decisional law, weighing in with argu-
ments and opinions. Citizen influence on tort law extends even fur-
ther, into actual power over what happens in a case. Assertions
from the plaintiff are especially powerful.
Traditionally, the plaintiff is not thought of as an authority.
His label derives from the Latin planctus, or lamentation.26 One
gets the sense of somebody wailing, beseeching, or hoping, not a
decisionmaker. Judges and commentators typically regard him as
an amateur, if not a dupe, vulnerable to the maneuvers of a power-
ful adversary.27 A plaintiffs participation is never sufficient to cre-
ate tort doctrine. Yet his presence is necessary and powerful enough
to shape results.
It is the plaintiff-and for this purpose we can include a de-
fendant who behaves in a plaintiffish manner by bringing a coun-
terclaim or crossclaim-who tells the court which questions to de-
cide, what the case is about. Any point that does not interest the
plaintiff stays out of the case; he thus holds a kind of unstated veto
power. A court that wants to weigh in on a question of tort doctrine,
as the courts in Palsgraf, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, and
Rowland v. Christian were reputed to want,28 must wait for a suit-
able litigant and cannot stray too far from the story he tells. When-
ever he decides not to sue, doctrine remains stagnant-a point cen-
25. The Supreme Coures singular reference to storytelling and narrative, for example, ap-
pears in a criminal context. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997). Much of
the literature in the law reviews commending narrative addresses race. See, e.g., Richard Dol-
gado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411
(1989); Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United
States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. SOc. POVY & L. 195 (2000).
26. See 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 956 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "plaint").
27. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (excusing plain-
tiff from complying with a notice requirement under the Uniform Sales Act, because of his pre-
sumed naivetd); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 98-103 (1974) (noting power of "repeat players").
28. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Greenman, 377 P.2d 897; Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
[Vol. 54:3:13671374
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tral to the work of Kent Syverud, Ellen Smith Pryor, and others
who remind us that because plaintiffs choose to go, A la Willie Sut-
ton, where the money is, American tort law remains barren and
primitive in areas where insurance coverage is unavailable, espe-
cially intentional torts.29 The fraction of litigants' circumstances
that are conveyed to the courts by plaintiffs create the common law
of Torts.
A more noted amateur source of authority in Torts is the
civil jury. Almost isolated in the world on this point, American civil
litigants typically have a right to present their case before a group
of lay factfinders. Unlike the grand jury of criminal law or the ex-
pert panels that are assembled on occasion to decide key points dis-
puted in tort litigation, the Torts factfinder will typically consist of
a group of utter novices who know next to nothing about adjudica-
tion or legal doctrine. 30 Even though lawyers, government officials,
law enforcement personnel, and experienced jurors are usually not
barred from jury service, a strong custom still tends to eliminate
them whenever more amateurish persons are available to fill the
jury.3 1 Other customs keep jurors in the dark: Trial judges often do
not permit them to take notes;3 2 jury instructions are written to get
past appellate review as statements of the law rather than to en-
lighten;3 3 when jurors ask questions of trial judges to clarify their
29. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rope Victinms and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1467-68 (1999) (objecting to the absence of meaningful remedies for inten-
tional harm, an absence attributable to insurance coverage rules). Se also Ellen S. Pryor, The
Stories We TelL Intentional Harin and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEM. L REV. 1721,
1722 (1997) (describing the phenomenon of "underpleading" in order to reach insurance policies);
Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEE L REV. 1629, 1632 (1994)
(describing a symbiotic relationship between the plaintiffs' bar and the insurance industry).
30. Cf. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (quoting Erwin
Griswold, dean of the Harvard Law School, as deeming the jury trial "the apotheosis of the ama-
teur").
31. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L REv. 257, 298 (1986) (noting
the custom of exclusion, and that occasional statutes bar government officials from jury service).
32. The leading case on jury note-taking is United States v. Moclean, 578 F.2d 64, 65-67 (3d
Cir. 1978); see also Dragan D. Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note.Taking--Misconduct, Right, or
Privilege?, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 125, 130 (1965) (arguing for modification of "misconduct" notion);
Douglas C. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L REV. 441, 448-581 (1997) (urging a more active conception of the
jury's role, which would include questioning witnesses and communicating with fellow jurors, as
well as note-taking).
33. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective,
40 ARiz. L REV. 849, 866-69 (1998) (summarizing literature). Most of the evidence about juror
incomprehension comes from simulations. One exception is Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors
Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming 33
LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 74-77 (1998) (noting limitations of simulations). Professor Saxton
concluded that the problem of incomprehension was significant. Id. at 94.
1375
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
understanding of the law, these judges frequently refuse to
answer.34 These conditions affirm the principle that elite expertise
cannot give Torts everything it needs to work well.
3. The Pecuniary Nature of Remedies Does Not Deny Emotional
and Dignitary Harm
Tort law remains remarkably averse to non-pecuniary relief.
Plaintiffs who want an injunction, an apology, medical monitoring,
a prior restraint, or even a declaratory judgment, rather than (or in
addition to) money, will seldom achieve these goals.35 When Leslie
Bender proposed that managers of an errant corporation should,
following a judicial determination that a product was tortiously
marketed, be compelled to provide hands-on care for injured victims
(Professor Bender's paradigm defendant was A.H. Robins Co.,
maker of the Dalkon Shield), her suggestion seemed to affront an
audience at the AALS annual meeting,36 and had no visible effect on
the law of tort remedies. One might have thought that Ronald
Coase's great insight about nuisance law-that cessation of activity
is costly in the same way that writing a check to plaintiffs in order
to honor a judgment is costly37-might have achieved at long last
the modern merger of law and equity: According to the Coase theo-
rem, money damages are commensurable with everything. Yet the
two realms remain separate, and plaintiffs typically receive either
money or no money-and nothing else-after they allege that a de-
fendant wronged them.
Despite this affirmation of the money-matrix, however, tort
law has never failed to acknowledge the reality of those injuries
that can be remedied only approximately in cash. One of the oldest
judicial opinions that can be read today as part of the common law
34. See United States v. Taylor, 828 F. 2d 630, 632 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the trial
judge refused to answer a question about legal residency requirements); cf. United States v.
Davis, 109 F. Supp. 2d 991, 993 n.5 (S.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that, in response to a question about
the scope of indictment, the trial judge did not directly answer the jury's question, but instead
referred the jury to the instructions).
35. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009
(1999) (describing apology as an alternative to judicially declared remedies); Craig A. Stevens,
Casenote, Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army: The Recovery of Medical Moni.
toring Under HSCA's Citizen Suit Provision, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 215 (1999) (noting "frus-
tration" of plaintiffs who seek medical monitoring).
36. I speak from memory, having been in that audience in January 1990. The proposal is
published in Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TUIA L.J. 759, 769-70 & n.23
(1990), where Professor Bender relates some of this negative reaction.
37. Ronald A. Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
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of Torts, the medieval I de S et ux. v. W de S,38 awarded "half a
mark" as damages to compensate a woman for the injury she suf-
fered when a man angrily threw a hatchet toward her as she looked
out from her tavern window; 39 the defendant's action affected only
her tranquility and dignity. The ancient tort of trespass to land
deems a plaintiff injured by the "breaking of the close," an invasion
into what one might anachronistically call his personal space, un-
derstood in geographic terms:40 Even if the defendant leaves the
land unchanged by his fleeting intrusion, the plaintiff is entitled to
money damages. 41 Although defamation law has taken many shapes
and been adjudicated in many different fora, including ecclesiasti-
cal courts, its enduring concerns-reputation, dignity, and the idea
that words wound4 2-share the trait of not having an exact price.
Contemporary attempts to limit recompense for emotional,
dignitary, or other non-pecuniary harm, which rise and flourish in
the lobbies of legislatures, are thus alien newcomers to Torts. Such
proposals do not deserve to be called conservative: The business of
tort law, by long tradition, partakes of sympathetic imagination
about that which cannot be stated in a corporate ledger.43 Impreci-
sion in commensurability has always been at least tolerated, if not
openly embraced, within Torts.
4. Parties Are Situated in Communities
Although individual litigants form claims, tort law also rec-
ognizes parties to litigation as members of groups and
communities. 44 "Fault" in negligence law, for example, means more
38. I de S et ux. v. W de S, Y.B. Lib. Ass. folio 99, plac. 60 (Assizes 1348), reprinted in \VADE
ET AL., supra note 15, at 33-34.
39. Id.
40. Frank v. Mayberry, 985 P.2d 773, 776 (Okla. 1999) (reciting standard formulation).
41. See Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) ('For every such entry against the will
of the possessor, the law infers some damages.").
42. See generally Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 VASH. & LEE U RLV. 535,
556 (1988) (surveying history of the tort, and noting that change has been its most constant
theme).
43. Thus even though the concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection will counsel in-
surance providers not to offer first-party insurance for pain and suffering, as George Priest has
noted in The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1547-48 (1987),
it does not follow that tort law should similarly refuse to translate pain and suffering claims into
dollars for plaintiffs.
44. This recognition is particularly central to accident law. Intentional torts occur in more
individualistic contexts. But see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1135 n.10 (claiming that
some intentional tort liability is really strict liability "for having acted in ignorance of prevalent
social usages").
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than the failure to take cost-justified precautions; it encompasses
the failure to live up to what might be called the attainable ideals
that derive from shared communal life.45 Observations of other peo-
ple, as well as experiences within groups, will teach an individual
that inadvertence, distraction, and excessive self-regard have con-
sequences for which she may be held responsible. This lesson can-
not be learned entirely from the sensory experience of direct one-on-
one impacts.
Variations on the objective standard in negligence illustrate
the recognition of collectives as sources of identity and personal de-
velopment. When the defendant in Vaughan v. Menlove tried to es-
cape the rigors of ordinary prudence by arguing that he was too
unintelligent to act reasonably, he lost.46 Commentators defend this
result with various rationales, 47 to which one might add that all of
the approved downward-departure variations require an actor to
identify himself as a member of a group, not just as a flawed indi-
vidual. By treating children more leniently than adults with respect
to the accidents they cause, for instance, tort law situates the child
in a community of peers while in effect warning her that she is ex-
pected to grow up and learn from the adults; maturation must in-
clude regard for a larger world around her.48 Blind people are ag-
gregated with fellow blind people to yield a sense of what the rea-
sonable person would do if he were blind. 49 The literature on subjec-
tive deviations from the objective standard based on mental im-
pairment stresses integration of distinct, separate groups into the
larger collective. 50
45. See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1439-40 (2000) (identifying these ideals as based on a combina-
tion of prudence and care).
46. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
47. See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 286-88 (summarizing rationales); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TORTS 111-12 (1999) (noting ambiguities in the standard rationales); CLARENCE
MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 51-52 (2d ed. 1980) ('[I]f liability for negli-
gence is to be educative, perhaps the time had come to try to teach Menlove to do better."). Gary
Schwartz endorses this conventional wisdom in his General Principles. Discussion Draft, supra
note 1, § 9 cmt. e (noting administrative convenience and the need to promote safety); id. § 10
cmt. b (expressing concern about self-serving testimony).
48. See Caroline Forell, Reassessing the Negligence Standard of Care for Minors, 15 N.M. L.
REV. 485, 498 (1985).
49. See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 281-84.
50. See, e.g., Sarah Light, Note, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and
the Mentally Disabled Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381, 390-92 (1999) (arguing that the goal
of integration is more important than the notion of security suggested by confinement); Stepha-
nie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153, 164-
67 (1983) (describing ideal of integration).
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The Torts concept of custom identifies individuals as mem-
bers of subgroups in almost an anthropological sense. Folkways and
traditions of these groups strongly influence the determination of
whether a defendant was at fault. 51 For medical malpractice actions
in particular, custom is well-nigh dispositive.5 2 In an irony that
Richard Epstein may have been the first to point out, Learned
Hand, famous for writing the landmark decision associated with
allocative efficiency as a method to determine liability in tort, is
also famous for noting custom; 53 the two devices point in opposite
directions.5 4 An inefficient custom can command respect in tort law;
the practices of communities can outweigh aggregate utility.55
Paired relations appear all over Torts. The roles of landlord,
bailor, seller, jailer, innkeeper, employer, and common carrier,
among others, generate obligations to another half of the dyad.
Contracts and other voluntary undertakings impose some of these
relations, but others arise simply from status. 6 In these pairings
the defendant is deemed responsible because of understandings
about dyadic communities. Even when tort-speak strips an individ-
ual of her name and calls her A, or refers to her land with a generic
term like Blackacre, it remains aware of group membership: B and
Whiteacre, the partners, are seldom far away.
Just as persons are situated within communities for pur-
poses of tort doctrine, so too are their injuries. For example, a pub-
lished communication that diminishes the plaintiffs reputation
only within her small-minded and otherwise deviant community
may be deemed defamatory by a factfinder who can know the mores
of that community only secondhand.5 7 A bigoted notion of rape vic-
51. See MORRiS & MORRiS, supra note 47, at 98-100.
52. See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 133-34, 639. There are a handful of exceptions. See id. at
643-44 (noting that Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), flatly rejected an unrefuted
expert consensus about opthalmological practice). Current informed consent doctrine is perhaps
another exception. See id. at 655-56.
53. In The T.J. Hooper, Hand wrote that "in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact com-
mon prudence," yet nevertheless custom cannot provide a "final answer" about negligence. The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932); see also United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (propounding the Hand formula, an approach to negligence
congruent with allocative efficiency).
54. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper The Theory and History of Custom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1992).
55. Professor Epstein endorses this posture in his study of the famous Learned Hand opin-
ions. Id. at 4.
56. See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 581.
57. See, e.g., Nazeriv. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993) (stating that"a false
allegation of homosexuality is defamatory in lissouri" even though reasonable persons would
not deem the plaintiff disparaged); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the
Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1996) (discussing the notion, first stated in Peck
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tims as somehow deserving what they suffered warrants robust
condemnation from all of us reasonable persons, but tort law has
recognized that a woman can be injured by being called a rape vic-
tim.58 Invasion of privacy also situates plaintiffs as members of
groups. "Intrusion upon seclusion" and "false light 59 are incoherent
concepts in a vacuum; in order to consider them, a factfinder must
acknowledge the existence of collective-based sources of identity.60
Courts also use such contexts in order to assess claims of privilege,
whereby behavior identified elsewhere as tortious conduct-and
which the plaintiff experiences as injurious and wrongful-may es-
cape sanction because of notions about a social need, or the nature
of a relationship. For some claims, in short, group membership is
crucial to the question of whether a tort has occurred at all.
5. Action is Presumptively More Desirable Than Inaction 61
Like contract law, tort law encourages people to pursue what
they identify as their own projects and opportunities. This prefer-
ence is more striking in Torts than Contracts, because whereas con-
tract law generally binds only volunteers, Torts is willing to see in-
nocent bystanders suffer in the name of the principle. 62 Universal
inaction-everybody staying home doing nothing-would greatly
reduce the quantity of tortious conduct and the social cost of inju-
v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909), of a "substantial and respectable minority" community
in which the plaintiff could be defamed).
58. See Youssoupoffv. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581, 584 (CA 1934).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 952B (1977) (describing a cause of action for in-
trusion upon seclusion); id. § 652E (referring to "publicity placing person in false light"),
60. For instance, the privacy tort is probably not available for a husband or wife to sue a
spouse for walking into the household bathroom without knocking when the husband or wife
inside has protested this practice-even though bathroom invasions would constitute "intrusion
upon seclusion" if done between strangers and even though the abrogation of most intraspousal
immunities has meant that spouses can usually sue each other as if they were strangers. See Ira
Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV.
1268, 1331-32 (1996) (discussing this example). Cf. Lidsky, supra note 57, at 1-4 (noting the
impossibility of defamation law without a sense of identity emergent from group membership).
61. Professor Jill Fisch, a participant at the Wade conference, thought of this Alternative
Principle while sitting in the audience. I thank her for this insightful contribution.
62. One prominent casebook begins with Hammontree v. Jenner, a decision that rejected
strict liability for injuries attributed to an unexpected epileptic seizure. See MARC A. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 1996). The
plaintiffs in Hammontree were perfectly innocent, whereas the defendant had driven a car while
aware that he suffered from epilepsy. Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 529 (1971).
The Franklin and Rabin book uses the case to illustrate the overriding need to permit human
mobility, even though innocents will suffer unremedied injuries in consequence.
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ries, but tort law does not endorse this outcome.6 Its recognition of
communities does not deny its overwhelming affirmation of every
individual's right to move about. Freedom for individuals is consid-
ered a source of wealth. 4
Tort law expresses this preference by making fault or negli-
gence the basic rule for accidents, and strict liability the exception.
The former rule seeks to encourage care within an activity; the lat-
ter casts a shadow on an entire endeavor. 65 Isolating strict liability
as suited only to a minority of human activities bespeaks a prefer-
ence for action over inaction.
6. Peaceful Coexistence is Encouraged, Where Feasible
Similar to the balance it strikes between acclaiming action,
on the one hand, and acknowledging that inaction conduces to
safety, on the other, tort law finds a midpoint between absolute en-
titlement for compensation for injury caused by the act of another,
on the one hand, and absolute freedom to carry out risky activities,
on the other.66 Although the rubrics vary--"proximate cause," "pol-
icy," "affirmative defenses," and so forth-a uniting principle favors
compromise, toward peaceful coexistence. This attitude is not of
itself doctrine, but a base on which doctrine rests.
We find this contention in legal maxims, doctrinal rules, le-
gal scholarship, and traditions of adjudication. Judges use phrases
such as de minimis non curat lex67 and "live and let live"6 to ex-
press this approach to Torts disputes. The tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is home of both Calvert Magruder's infa-
63. "If a man always acted at his peril, the whole community would be in gaol but for three
obstacles. No one could legally build the gaol, no one could legally send people to it, and no one
could legally keep them there." Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LQ. REV.
37, 38 (1926).
64. See Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873) (We must have factories, machinery,
dams, canals and railroads.").
65. See EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 89-90 (summarizing this contrast and pointing out that it
has been overdrawn).
66. See Feldman, supra note 45, at 1433 (identifying tort doctrine as mediating between
freedom and security). I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Ag-
gression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2001).
67. "The law does not concern itself with trifles." According to a November 20, 2000. search
of the Mega file of the Mega library in Lexis, 1503 published judicial opinions (not all of which
are about Torts disputes) contain this phrase.
68. See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. Ch. 1862). This phrase is not so popular
with judge-authors as the de rnininis maxim; only 108 cases turned up in a November 20, 2000
search, see supra note 67, and several of them were referring to a business enterprise called
"Live and Let Live."
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mous (but sometimes quite accurate) comment that "there is no
harm in asking"69 for a sexual favor, at one end of the continuum,
and the understanding that behaviors that exceed the bounds of
toleration will be classified as tortious, because they are outra-
geous,7 0 at the other. In scholarship, George Fletcher situates Torts
as occupying a central point between Contracts and Criminal Law;71
similarly, Jay Tidmarsh describes Torts as simultaneously "concep-
tualist" and "anti-conceptualist,"72 suggesting centrism. Lay par-
ticipation in Torts decisionmaking brings a commonsense perspec-
tive to disputes. 73
B. The Alternative Principles in Contrast to the General Principles
What's wrong with these Alternative Principles? By refer-
ence to which goals are they irregular? One might begin with the
ALI tradition that associates improvement with something like
utilitarianism or pragmatism (in a popular rather than a philo-
sophical sense) and with reference to decisional law: Restatement
blackletter, some believe, ought to be of help in deciding cases. 74
This criticism might condemn the Alternative Principles as too
vague or indeterminate to aid the work of a trial judge or a jury
struggling with a particular case. Two flaws mar this conclusion,
however. The first is that the Institute is not, in fact, committed to
a principle of workaday utilitarianism in the crafting of its Re-
statements. The second is that this version of a utility criterion-
utility, that is, to answer a question about the law that disputants
pose in litigation-would exclude much of the Perlman work prod-
uct, and some of the Schwartz blackletter as well. To the extent
69. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1055 (1936).
70. See, e.g., Glenn v. Cent. Contra Costa County Transit Auth., No. C 98-4940 CRB, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5255, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1999) (holding that an allegation that defendants
encouraged another employee to accuse the plaintiff of sexual harassment fulfills this "exceeded
the bounds" criterion); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 340 S.E.2d 116, 121 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(terming allegations of harassment severe enough to exceed what decent society would tolerate).
71. See generally George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347 (1996)
(contrasting the victim-protective principle of criminal law and the collaborative principle of
contract law; Torts lies between them).
72. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1994).
73. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3.
74. See Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 582, 595 (1935) (faulting the
First Restatement for its uselessness as jury instructions).
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that it did not stop the General Principles, it cannot support rejec-
tion of the Alternative Principles.7 5
If the American Law Institute thought of usefulness as a ba-
sis to include or exclude provisions in Restatements, then it would
operate with some definition of the term, and would, after pro-
pounding blackletter, invite feedback and make use of this re-
sponse. Postponing for a moment the problem that the Institute has
no clear definition of usefulness or utility, one must first acknowl-
edge that the Institute does not ignore its work product after re-
leasing it for consumption. The ALI has numerous members whose
work gives them an excellent vantage point on both the function of
Restatement provisions and the circumstances they try to address:
Sitting judges and senior litigators with years of experience in a
subject are valuable informants. Restatement in the Courts has long
counted citations, even back when computerless retrieval technol-
ogy used to make the task laborious; this collection of data can eas-
ily get bigger and faster.
Neither its engaged membership nor powerful information
technology, however, can tell the ALI reliably whether a Restate-
ment provision has passed or failed the test of utility. Working
judges and lawyers have no incentive to expunge anything idle from
the Restatement, or even to complain about non-utility. Only an im-
portant or controversial provision will make a strong claim on their
time. As for citations, their number does not indicate the utility of
any Restatement provision. Judges have cited Restatement sections
to make points other than endorsement.7 6 Other citations have
filled string cites, adding no independent strength to an assertion.
Perhaps the most useful provisions make litigation go away.77 The
75. In an essay on the task of pulling together Torts decisional law, Denis Brion argues that
"the Restatement project (which he does not define) demonstrates the "extreme difficulty in
deriving a rational structure of doctrine that comprehensively embraces the accumulation of
relevant judicial decisions at any particular moment." Denis J. Brion, The Chaotic Indetermi-
nacy of Tort Law: Between Formalism and Nihilism, in RADICAL PHILOS0PHs OF LAW 179, 180
(David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds., 1995). The most one can derive from reading Torts
decisions is what Brion calls "quasi-order' which "appears not at the level of doctrine but at the
deeper level of theme." Id. at 193. According to this view, the Alternative Principles-thematic
rather than rule-asserting-are as useful as any summaries of tort law can be.
76. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Inc. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995)
C([W]e need not, and do not, adopt the formulation of the Restatement (Third) at this time . .;
Banca Cremi v. Alex. Brown, 955 F. Supp. 499, 522 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that Maryland rejects
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319,
1331 (Conn. 1997) (vehemently rejecting the "reasonable alternative design" requirement of the
Restatement (Third)).
77. John Wade was justifiably proud of Section 339 of the Second Restatement; he measured
its success not by counting hits but by the gradual disappearance of the unfortunate phrase
"attractive nuisance" from caselaw-a kind of anti-citation, dog-that-didn't-bark indicator of
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retired heavyweight champion of citation, Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second), was to Reporter-aspirants James Henderson
and Aaron Twerski something to be revised: In their 1992 article
advocating a new restatement of products liability, Henderson and
Twerski noted the large number of citations to § 402A,78 thereby
suggesting that citation frequency does not prove the absence of
disarray, volatility, and the need for reform.
The Model Penal Code, the closest to a compendium of gen-
eral principles that the Institute has heretofore published, bears
mention here. Like Professors Henderson and Twerski, who used
their scholarship to anticipate a products restatement, Herbert
Wechsler first framed his project in an article; 79 he thereupon spent
"every bit of time and energy" that he possessed for the next ten
years working on the Code.80 This experience makes Wechsler's per-
spective on ALI general-principles compendia relevant to our pres-
ent purpose. Wechsler, late in his life, described his perspective as
utilitarian.8 '
Wechsler elaborated to interviewers Norman Silber and
Geoffrey Miller:
Wechsler: I was trying to influence the ALI effort, which then was starting out un-
der absolutely terrible auspices and with literally fantastic conceptions. Fortu-
nately, it was aborted, partly I guess, because of Pearl Harbor. But if that damn
thing had gotten going, in those days, with the background premises and the ap-
proach of the people that were involved, I really think that the result would have
been disaster.
Silber and Miller: What was wrong with the premises and approach?
Wechsler: For one thing, the notion was somehow that the reordering of criminal
law involved a great empirical exercise. In other words, they needed millions and
millions of dollars in order to study something that you were going to go out into
the world and look at and count. I never got very clear on what it was that you
were going to count and look at, but the techniques of sociology were all going to be
conscripted-as though this was going to increase your insight as to whether forci-
ble sexual intercourse is something that a good society should try to protect people
against, whether you have to count something in order to know that ....
influence. John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to its Increasingly Advantageous
Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 59, 74 (1985).
78. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELLL. REV. 1512, 1527-29 (1992).
79. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1952).
80. Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 918 (1993) (quoting Professor
Wechsler).
81. "I have always been exceedingly utilitarian in my views and approaches," Wechsler said
in response to a question about his early views on codifying the criminal law. Id. at 869.
[Vol. 54:3:13671384
2001] THE PRESCRIPTION OF MASCULINE ORDER
We were trying to show that by sitting down and thinking and following what I
suppose one would call a method of philosophy-that is to say, a dialectical method
of putting to oneself questions and coming up with answers, expounding problems
and raising issues, discussing them-that one could make a good deal of progress
towards systemization, clarification, and improvement. 2
Although the Model Penal Code and various Restatements
have achieved considerable "systemization," it cannot be systematic
for an institution to propound blackletter for professional consump-
tion without establishing ex ante criteria or benchmarks to measure
its effects. If, to use Wechsler's illustration, everyone knows that
forcible sexual intercourse is wrong, then Restatement blackletter
declaring nothing more would be otiose. If, alternatively, the Model
Penal Code has something to say about forcible sexual intercourse
that we all do not already know, then its proposition is novel (and
probably controversial). A scholar will sometimes enjoy professional
gain inside the academy from novel proposals and assertions that
the outside world ignores. But the ALI aspires to participate in the
creation of new case law; it is obliged therefore to care whether its
offerings do or do not effect change. Such power cannot be known at
the propositional level in the way that peer review, for instance, can
measure the force of academic claims. Any plan to provide "exceed-
ingly utilitarian" law reform, therefore, must include real-life
measurement.8 3
By what measure of "utilitarianism," then, can an Alterna-
tive Principle like "Peaceful coexistence is encouraged, where feasi-
ble" or "Professionals share authority with non-professionals" be
deemed idle? Certainly a principle need not have the power to de-
cide disputes, if the General Principles are any guide. We know
that Gary Schwartz's blackletter about duty--"Findings of no duty
82. Id.
83. See supra note 81 (quoting Wechsler's use of "exceedingly utilitarian"). The Institute
not only commits no resources internally to this kind of empirical measurement of its most Gen-
eral Principles-like compilation: it has also not yet responded to one important external meas-
urement. Victoria Nourse used the very sensible technique of comparing Model Penal Code and
non-Model Penal Code jurisdictions to see whether the Code has been a force for good or ill on
the subject of provocation in the law of homicide. After surveying all of the reported cases of
intimate-partner homicide in the thirteen jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code where
the defendant asserted provocation, comparing them with non-Model Penal Code and "mixed7
jurisdictions, Professor Nourse concluded that the Model Penal Code has had a baleful effect,
tending to exonerate killers who felt provoked simply because the victim, a woman they wanted,
had left them or rejected their overtures. Victoria F. Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331, 1332-36 (1997). Such an analytic con-
clusion cannot be achieved by Wechsler's talking-to-ourselves Q&A, because it actually looks at
Restatements in the courts-not the citation checklist, but the experiences of judges, litigants,
and injured complainants. Without this investigation of the world, the Institute cannot know
which of its formulations are useful
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are unusual, and are based on judicial recognition of special prob-
lems of principle or policy that justify the withholding of liabil-
ity"S--tells judges and litigants almost nothing about how to re-
solve a dispute about whether a duty exists. His definition of negli-
gence in Section 4 of the Discussion Draft provides advice and guid-
ance rather than concrete rules, 85 and his Section 17, consisting of
one sentence, "The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care
insofar as it can foreseeably combine with or bring about the im-
proper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party," is all gentle sugges-
tion, a feel-free-to-disregard-me-if-you-like option containing two
conditional clauses, certainly nothing that will determine the out-
come of a dispute. 86 These quotations are not representative; most
of the Schwartz-authored blackletter lays down rules concretely.
They suffice, however, to show that an assertion is not unwelcome
per se in the General Principles simply because it cannot dispose of
litigants' contentions.
The Perlman-authored blackletter defies the tenet of out-
come-determinative utility much more overtly. Perlman's Section
2A, which is called "Basic Elements of a Tort Claim" and includes
five elements recited conjunctively, does not have any obvious util-
ity. Even assuming that the sorting of a claim into Torts or not of-
fers clear utility in practice (for example, to determine whether a
particular statute of limitation applies), Section 2A cannot be read
to mean, "If any of these elements are missing, then the claim is not
a tort claim," because some tort claims do not fit within these ele-
ments. The section on "obligations" of reasonable care87 similarly
does not indicate whether they are exhaustive or otherwise neces-
sary to a determination of liability.
Given this more flexible approach to utility with which the
Schwartz and Perlman-authored General Principles work, one can
readily identify utility in the Alternative Principles. When we start
to seek something more general (so to speak) than an answer to the
question of which of two litigants ought to prevail in a directed-
verdict dispute, the Alternative Principles offer pertinent guidance.
For example, many people of the Torts community-I mean to in-
clude litigators, judges, academics, and even legislators-take an
interest in the division of power between legislators and judges to
84. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6.
85. Id. § 4 (listing "[p]rimary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks rea-
sonable care").
86. Id. § 17.
87. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5, §§ 103-04.
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decide Torts questions. The phrase "legislative supremacy" has
proved enduring and influential in Torts case law and commentary,
though not entirely self-enforcing or -defining.88 A contrary asser-
tion, about the power of citizen initiative, states a principled objec-
tion to some claims of legislative supremacy. It also shows that the
power struggle goes beyond legislators versus judges: Organized,
institutional interests are juxtaposed against citizen protest.83
Similarly, proposals to limit the role of lay juries in Torts should be
seen as contrary to a general principle about the subject-a judg-
ment that should not of itself quash the proposals, but raise ques-
tions about them.
The question of whether a candidate for Restatement black-
letter is useful can also be considered with reference to the ALI as
an institution, and here again the Alternative Principles manifest
utility. A strong tradition in the Institute looks for "the best."90 Like
Wechsler's utilitarianism, this preference lacks a factual predicate:
Consumers of ALI work product have not been told clearly what
makes something or someone better than another. The Platonic
ideal of putting civic power in the hands of wise philosophers may
yield answers to questions that Restatement blackletter aspires to
answer, but it is contrary to the principle of sharing power with
amateurs, outsiders, and non-elite citizens. The ALI has had occa-
sion to consider the overlap between access to the Institute and
wealth or social privilege,9' and has become more sensitive to the
88. This point arose at a symposium on the role ofjudges as tort lawmakers. See Richard L
Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L REV. 533,
533-35 (1999) (noting difficulties of legislative supremacy); Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Cen-
trifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 433 n.58 (1999) (noting controversy over whether Section 402A
of the Second Restatement illegitimately gained ascendancy over the legislature's UCC).
89. See Abel, supra note 88, passim.
90. See What is the American Law Institute? 2 (1935) (unpublished manuscript).
91. Prominent members of the ALI have put these concerns at the fore. See Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American Law Institute,
1995 WIs. L REV. 1, 38 (describing ALI efforts to combine unabashed elitism with a diverse
membership); Alex Elson, 'From the Trenches and Towers . The Case for an In.Depth Study of
the American Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQ. 625, 631 (1998) (noting that the ALI has been
regarded as elitist). The ALI has been attacked from the outside as biased in favor of the
wealthy and powerful. See, e.g., Walter Gordon, Strict Legal Liability, Upper Class Criminality,
and tlw Model Penal Code, 26 How. LJ. 781, 796-97 (1983) (accusing the ALI of hypocrisy and
class bias for rejecting strict liability for corporate crimes but imposing it for felony murder);
Paul A. Simmons, Governnent by an Unaccountable Private Non Profit Corporation, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 67, 83-84, 97 (1992) (faulting the AM as undemocratic, and arguing that Re-
statements should have no weight in the courts); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution
or Bleak to the Future: Subrinsl New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy
Problem," 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 91 (1994) (contending that because it is a less elite organization,
the American Bar Association rather than the ALI should handle discovery reform).
1387
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
dangers of restating the law of politically fraught contexts, such as
consumer banking, without due regard for the interests of weaker
sectors.92 The Alternative Principles invite the ALI to contemplate
the tension between elitism and the subject under consideration in
the General Principles. Even if the Institute concludes that exper-
tise and elites are better than ignorance and amateurs for all sub-
jects (even Torts), a recognition of the Alternative Principles coun-
sels that the ALI balance between improvement and description 93
might be struck in favor of description in an area where lay
authority is so strong.
Furthermore, by departing from a strict notion of rigid, ato-
mistic separation between human beings, the Alternative Principles
declare that the ALI's prior penchant for calling people A, B, C, and
such in Illustrations is at odds with a tradition in tort law. Illustra-
tions in the Restatement (Third)-written by both Gary Schwartz in
the General Principles and Aaron Twerski and James Henderson in
the Products Liability comments-already move in this direction. In
the General Principles Schwartz writes about "Joanne, a
physician,"94 and "Sharon," a driver who injures "Dan" and "Nate."95
Schwartz reserves "A" and "B" to stand for nonhuman hypotheti-
cals, such as possible causes of an injury.9 6 In moving away from
Restatement (Second)-era non-humanism (and also in recognizing,
by the way, that women are players on the Torts stage), these Illus-
trations admirably declare that tort law is about human beings.9 7 It
may be time to go further and acknowledge the web of relationships
that brings people together.98 Stating that "parties are situated in
92. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Proc-
ess: Some Lessons From the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 162 (1993) (advo-
cating new procedures for uniform law drafting and enactment to assure "reasonable accommo-
dation among the interests of all affected groups"). Professor Patchel, once an external critic of
the ALI, went on to serve as an Associate Reporter for the UCC revision. See Michael Green-
wald, American Law Institute to Return to Washington for 77th Annual Meeting (listing Professor
Patchel as an Associate Reporter for the UCC revision), available at http://www.ali.org (last
visited February 22, 2001).
93. See Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1667 (1995) (book re-
view) (referring to the ALI goals of "reconciliation and reform").
94. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. d, illus. 5.
95. Id. § 7 cmt. a, illus. 1.
96. Id. § 15 cmt. g.
97. The Restatement of Apportionment favors the A, B, and C approach to Illustrations. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j, illus. 1-2 (Pro-
posed Final Draft (Revised) Mar. 22, 1999).
98. This argument is stated in Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 595-96 (1993).
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communities" usefully identifies the existence of groups, long rec-
ognized in tort law.
By refusing to say how any particular case should come out,
the Alternative Principles fit nicely within the Torts corpus. In this
area of the law, judicial decisions become famous more for the ques-
tions they raise than the answers they deliver. Quick: name a
landmark Torts case. Does it state a crisp rule or principle? Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motors comes to mind as a great, stark moment in
the history of Torts, although its significance perhaps needed the
efforts of Edward Levi and William Prosser to reach full effect 9
But most other landmarks twinkle elusively out of restatability:
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,100 with its nearly even split
between two views; Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,' 0 '
which cannot even be classified within an elementary fault/non-
fault divide; Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co. v. Goodman,10 2 glori-
ously wrong; Brown v. Kendall, 103 on its surface an account of a
fight between two dogs, but to some readers an allegory or parable
about the railroad industry. 04 The subject presents itself in topics
and themes, without the rule-focus found in the many landmark
cases of Contracts or Criminal Law. 10 5
Finally, the Alternative Principles challenge the unspoken
norm that the ALI must work only with a small stack of reported
appellate decisions.10 6 In looking at such motley and ambiguous
sources as the jury, "citizen initiative," the intermittently fashion-
able concept of "communities," and the notion of amiability inherent
in "peaceful coexistence," the Alternative Principles refuse to en-
force rigid separation between subject and object. In the Restate-
ment (Second), by contrast, Prosser and Wade always knew who
they were and what they were looking at. The subject is the re-
stater himself; his object is a small percentage of reported judicial
99. MacPherson v. Buick Motors, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
100. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
101. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
102. Baltimore & Oh. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
103. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
104. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359.
368 (1951) (referring to the desire of Justice Shaw to use his Brown v. Kendall opinion "to make
risk-creating enterprise less hazardous to investors and entrepreneursP); see also MORTON
HORWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 99-108 (1977) (arguing that
nineteenth-century private law advanced a judicial agenda to protect industry).
105. See generally Tidmarsh, supra note 72, at 1331 (describing Torts 'as being in perpetual
process, a timeless battlefront scarred by previous skirmishes among theories, doctrines, and
practices ....").
106. Cf. Elson, supra note 91, at 633 (attributing to Judge Richard Posner the view that ALl
members are insufficiently diverse with respect to their training in disciplines other than law).
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decisions. This citadel of certainty about what defines the object
under study had already fallen before I even dreamed of my Alter-
native Principles; the Restatement (Third) relies liberally on secon-
dary materials. Schwartz in particular is willing to learn from and
cite law review articles, monographs by nonlawyers, an unscripted
remark by Prosser, 10 7 a newspaper clipping, 08 a veterinary text for
clinicians, 0 9 Sports Illustrated,"n0 and other eclectic sources. Profes-
sors Henderson and Twerski looked at state statutes in compiling
their products liability Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Li-
ability."'
The next step in this eclecticism, a short one indeed, is to
admit forthrightly that Restatements restate more than the ratios
decidendi of reported decisions from the appellate courts. The "lit-
erally fantastic" 2 pre-World War II plan of the American Law In-
stitute to invest in sociological studies to find out the obvious, cas-
tigated by Herbert Wechsler, certainly sounds like a bad idea, but
what Wechsler deemed its happy antithesis, "sitting down and
thinking and following.., a dialectical method of putting to oneself
questions and coming up with answers,"" 3 leaves too many ques-
tions unanswered and cannot serve as a sole method. The sources
for Restatements are undeniably more diverse. Pluralistic material
is now a fact from which the ALI cannot retreat.
In sum, the Alternative Principles suggest that the General
Principles do not emerge naturally and inevitably from the content
of contemporary tort law." 4 Once an observer identifies a tendency
within the General Principles to exclude and dismiss relevant
source material, new questions arise. What gets lost in these exclu-
sions and dismissals? How does this tendency relate to other events
and experiences in the history of law reform? Is exclusion the right
response to irregularity, dissent, and pluralistic contradictions?
107. E.g., Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 21 cmt. j.
108. E.g., id. § 21 cmt. i.
109. E.g., id. § 20 cmts. b, d, g.
110. Id. § 20 Reporters' Notes.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20 Reporters' Notes, at 48-50
(1998) (mentioning, in Reporters' Notes, that Illinois and Louisiana among other states, had
adopted statutes requiring a plaintiff in a design-defect case to prove a reasonable alternative
design).
112. See supra text accompanying note 80.
113. Silber & Miller, supra note 80, at 918.
114. A similar conclusion could be drawn about the First and Second Restatements, but tho
point is even stronger today, following the growth of a deeper literature about the work of tho
American Law Institute. See supra notes 91-92.
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II. RESTATEMENTS AND THE GENDERED UNIVERSAL
A. The Method. Order Emergent from Observation
The idea that one can master the chaotic-looking world by
using a faculty for detached observation derives from seventeenth-
century forebears, notably R~ne Descartes and Francis Bacon." 5
This notion maintains that a correct vantage point, made opera-
tional through necessary intellectual commitments, brings order.
Order exists in at least two distinct senses associated with each of
the thinkers. Descartes differentiated res cognitans, the reality that
a person experiences based on knowing who he or she is, and res
extensa, the world beyond, mysterious and unintelligible, and per-
haps not even real. 116 By contrast Bacon claimed that knowledge,
derived from standing in the proper vantage point, becomes the ba-
sis for masterful action.117
The "prescription of masculine order" is not synonymous
with sexism. Whereas Bacon acquired a reputation for despising
and repudiating women thoroughly, 1 8 Descartes enjoyed many mu-
tually respectful relationships with women.119 His decision to site
philosophy entirely in the mind of an individual-a geography that
dismissed monasteries, universities, and libraries, all of which
barred women from study, as inessential to this work-offered
women a unique invitation to a subject that had never previously
tolerated their presence. Privileged women of the seventeenth cen-
tury knew well what a gift Descartes was giving them, and they
were among his earliest disciples. 12 0 The prescription of masculine
order, then, can readily coexist with generous, egalitarian attitudes
115. See, e.g., Karen T. Litfin, The Gendered Eye in lte Sky: A Feminist Perspective on Earth
Observation Satellites, FRONTIERS, Mar. 1997, at 26 (arguing that space.based observation of
Earth is an example of Baconian ordering).
116. See Karl Stem, Descartes, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF REN9 DESCARTES, supra
note 13, at 29, 36-42.
117. See FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 39 (Fulton H. Anderson ed., 1960) (1620)
("Human knowledge and power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot
be produced.").
118. See generally Alan Soble, In Defense of Bacon, 25 PHIL SOC. SCI. 192 (1995) (summa-
rizing this view of Bacon, as stated in the writings of Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant, and
Evelyn Fox Keller).
119. See, eg., Thomas E. Wartenberg, Descartes's Moo& 27Te Question of Feminism in the
Correspondence with Elisabeth, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF RMN9 DESCARTES, supra note
13, at 190, 190-210 (analyzing Descartes' friendship and correspondence with Princess Elisabeth
of Bohemia).
120. See, e.g., Cynthia B. Bryson, Ma ry Astell, Defender of the "Disembodied Mind, HYPATM,
Fall 1998, at 40 (describing an early feminist's appreciation for Descartes).
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toward women (just as women, including feminists, can prescribe
masculine order). 121
To get a sense of masculine order, it may be helpful to
imagine an approach to order associated with femininity. Order in a
feminine, and therefore disparaged, sense suggests attention to
trivial and peripheral matters. A wife and mother, in this stereo-
type, maintains order through such repetitive tasks as refereeing
squabbles among children, picking up small objects and moving
them someplace else, restocking a larder with mundane groceries
and then taking these items off the shelves to prepare meals, and
wiping away dirt and mess. It is impossible to think of her without
a contrast to the wide world outside her home: a man who "makes a
living" (the housewife has no claim on this phrase even after she
has made babies inside her own body) out in a public, entrepreneu-
rial space. The judiciary expresses its version of this dichotomy
with its notion of "housekeeping," 12 2 a word that judges use to clas-
sify those aspects of their work that they prefer not to do. 123 Like
his counterpart the housewife, the federal magistrate judge is a
lesser half, occupied with routine disorder and dirt-he referees
discovery squabbles, for existence, or picks up lesser scraps of the
caseload-in contrast to the Article III judge, a lordly source of
masculine order.124
Order in what we may call the feminine sense emphasizes
particulars and concrete, specific facts. The work of Carol Gilligan,
121. Cf. Catharine MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687,
695 (2000) ("If anyone does 'grand narratives,' I suppose I do ... ").
122. See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial
Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1990). Soon after the African-American college executive Ruth
Simmons was appointed president of Brown University, she described in an interview her work
style as president of Smith College with an analogy to housekeeping, something that her mother
had done to earn a living-. "It's like cleaning. Some people clean just enough so that what you
see looks good. I clean so that you can move the chair out of the way and not find dust bunnies
under it." Geneva Overholser, Rise of Women Could Change Sound of Power, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Nov. 27, 2000, at All (quoting Simmons and praising her for her "analogy overhaul" away from
"retreats and victories, blows delivered and knockouts scored, bulls'-eyes, pilings on, Hail.Mary
passes and hat tricks. A few fewer penalty boxes and fumbles, saturation bombings, shots across
the bow and hits below the belt-wouldn't this be a pleasure for everyone?").
123. See Resnik, supra note 122, at 958-59 (discussing social security appeals as an example
of work that Article III judges frequently assign to magistrate judges).
124. Even those commentators who are troubled by the rise of magistrates typically do not
abandon the effort to sort the trivial from the lordly. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Coping With
the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989)
(lamenting the proliferation of "adjuncts" to the federal judiciary, including law clerks, special
masters, and staff attorneys as well as magistrate judges, and arguing that their growth indi-
cates that Congress has been remiss for not limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts or
shifting the judicial workload to administrative agencies).
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on care as integral to moral reasoning, is central. Recall "Amy," al-
most a celebrity by now in the law reviews, who when asked, "Is it
right or wrong to steal a drug in behalf of one's dying wife when one
cannot afford to pay for it?," revealed herself as deficient by re-
sponding with questions about particulars (such as, "Couldn't the
would-be thief and the druggist negotiate some kind of payment
plan?") rather than identifying the problem as a war between two
large principles, the exclusive right of property versus the claim of
necessity. For Amy, order could not emerge except through consid-
eration of details and particulars. Juxtaposing two rights got her
nowhere; for Amy, order lay in the missing facts rather than tran-
scendence. 125
Order in the masculine sense thinks big, rather than small,
and seeks an overwhelming command. 126 A subject's faculty for ob-
servation should not, in this view, concern itself with the tiny, devi-
ant particular. Descartes insisted that cogitation yields truths of
the most profound and far-reaching kind; Bacon, no less grandly,
supposed that infinite knowledge about the world, its processes and
riches, and its utterly reliable mechanistic principles on which new
machines could depend, could be derived from the proper combina-
tion of detached observation and bold initiative. Masculine order is,
then, above all comprehensive.
A related characteristic is the determination to achieve co-
herence by positing out. For centuries male and female readers of
Descartes have been struck by the tendency of cogito, ergo sum to
exclude. 127 In achieving order by assertion, this seventeenth-
century method denies the existence of inconvenient conditions, es-
pecially those that bespeak subjectivity. 12 8 Order becomes more im-
portant than exceptions to order. Once cast as marginal or irrele-
vant, all posited-out exceptions are extrinsic to, and thus cannot
threaten, the built structure.
125. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO. E' 'S
DEVELOPMENT 24-39 (1982).
126. Donna Haraway writes about masculine "reductionism, when one language (guess
whose) must be enforced as the standard for all the translations and conversions. What money
does in the exchange orders of capitalism, reductionism does in the powerful mental orders of
global sciences: there is finally only one equation." DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND
WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 187-88 (1991).
127. See BRIAN EASLEA, SCIENCE AND SEXUAL OPPRESSION: PATRIARCHYS CONFRONTATION
WITH WoMAN AND NATURE 72-73 (1981) (cataloguing some of the exclusions posited in this phi-
losophy); Stern, supra note 116, at 36-46; Wartenberg, supra note 119, at 199-200 (recounting
the protests of Princess Elisabeth).
128. Desire, for one: individual wishes for anything other than the improvements (philo-
sophical or material) that derive from masterful perception are assumed not to exist. Diversity,
for another: plural, variant, and deviant impulses are also posited out.
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A third defining characteristic of masculine order is its su-
perimposition. Its proclamations about the world are asserted to
override conflicting prior assertions used to synthesize and under-
stand. Critiques of seventeenth-century philosophy describe a
"death of nature" where men like Bacon imposed a mechanical, in-
ert, lifeless Earth over an ancient understanding of the world as
alive and bountiful (though sometimes angry and refusing to yield
its fruits). 129 The planet had been alive, but Bacon saw to it that it
would now be dead-meaning under the control of a superimposed
scientific authority.
Related to this notion of superimposed mechanism, mascu-
line order is noted for its claim to neutrality, often accompanied by
an air of science. Neutrality calls for masculinity. The aspects of a
person that do not comport with an unchanging, detached Cartesian
gaze-such as living in a permeable, penetrable body, or being vul-
nerable to the shape-changes that result from getting pregnant and
ceasing to be pregnant-interface with the purity of observation. In
this kind of order, proclamations emerge from no personal vantage
point; they rest above politics and social strife.
B. The Method Practiced in Restatements
Law reformers have frequently prescribed masculine order.
Within American law, the prescription appears most stunningly in
restatements. Having once said that a restatement is a codification,
produced with attention for procedural or political legitimacy, that
strives to reconcile and improve the state of legal doctrine, I use
this word here to include more than ALI work products. 130 The Gen-
eral Principles (particularly its Perlman-written sections) is one of
several restatements that prescribe and try to follow a masculinist
ideal of order. In so doing, the General Principles emulate a foreign
tradition: National codes are prominent among the world's restate-
ments. We may therefore draw on codification and the civil law tra-
dition as well as ALI compendia to explore how restatements in
general, and the General Principles in particular, pursue this
end.' 3 '
129. See EASLEA, supra note 127, at 72. See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF
NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1980).
130. See Bernstein, supra note 93, at 1665.
131. In using the terms "codification" and "the civil law tradition" I do not mean to join on-
going discussions about what these words mean, nor to exaggerate the contrast between thorn on
the one hand and a common-law alternative on the other. See generally Gunther A. Weiss, The
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1. Order Through Codification
Restaters have suggested that reducing a jumble to blacklet-
ter is a bit like creating the world:13 2 "The chaotic state of the law
arises, of course, from the vast mass of unarranged, and sometimes
discordant, material. To take this material, separate the discordant
parts, analyze, compress, remold the rest, is to educe order out of
chaos." So wrote David Dudley Field in a letter to the California
Bar in 1870.133 Field, the most celebrated codifier in American his-
tory, may or may not have wanted to do his compressing and re-
molding in homage to another great proponent of codification,
Francis Bacon, who had written that by "art and the hand of man,"
Nature would be "forced out of her natural state and squeezed and
molded."134
Common themes emerge when one looks at the secondary
writings associated with efforts at codification. Although it is im-
possible to say briefly and accurately, for example, what the writers
of any national code thought they were doing or what they
achieved, 3 5 the work of codifying and restating, in general, reveals
attention to various aspects of masculine order. For centuries codes
have contained a certain male authoritarianism and even swagger.
One does not perhaps want to read too much into either phallic
etymology ("code" derives from the Latin codex or caudex, meaning
the trunk or stem of a tree) 3 6 or the Great Men political history of
codification which, as Pierre Legrand has pointed out, is "inextrica-
bly linked to the personae of Justianian, of Frederick the Great, of
Napoleon; even in common law jurisdictions like England and the
Enchantment of Codification in the Cornnn-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L 435, 438-41 (2000)
(arguing that the distinction between common-law and civil-law systems has always been over-
drawn, and is getting even smaller). Despite having stated a binary thesis in this Essay, I would
agree that all dichotomies should be read with the standard caveat about the danger of claiming
too much in the way of polar opposition.
132. Cf. DAVID NOBLE, THE RELIGION OF TECHNOLOGY 61-62 (1997) (describing a vision of
scientific progress that begins by man's first equaling the biblical Adam, who observed and
named everything in the world, and next by reaching "a truly divine understanding of creation
rather than its mere Adamic reflection").
133. Letter from David Dudley Field to the California Bar (Nov. 28, 1870), quoted in Levis
Grossman, Essay, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617, 628 (1994).
134. Francis Bacon, Novuin Organum, quoted in MERCHANT, supra note 129, at 171.
135. See generally James Gordley, Myths of the French Ciuil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459,
459-60 (1994) (arguing that current beliefs about the principles of the French Civil Code are
actually revisionist notions propounded by nineteenth-century treatise writers in France).
136. See Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated, 9 TUL EUR. & Cr..
L.F. 1, 5 (1994). The word "codification" was coined by Jeremy Bentham, who first wrote it in an
1815 letter to Tsar Alexander I. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 448. Several actual codes pre-
ceded the formation of this word. Id. at 449.
1395
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
United States where codification, as understood by civilian jurists,
has not taken hold, it evokes the names of Bentham and Field."'137
But the association is there, embodied in various male figures. 138
National codifiers like Robert Joseph Pothier of France and Andres
Bello of Latin America, for instance, are often called "fathers,"
authority figures blanketed in a "pervasive rhetoric of science, sanc-
tity, and perfection." 139 Associating codes with maleness, then, puts
this Essay on familiar terrain.
Equally familiar are the recurring characteristics associated
with national codes. As sketched by the German comparativist
Gunther Weiss, the defining elements of codification include "com-
pleteness" (the code must be "exclusive," "gapless," and "compre-
hensive"); "system;" "reform;" "national legal unification;" and "sim-
plicity." 140 With the exception of "reform"-which can subvert, or at
least confront, traditional hierarchies-these concepts all line up
with the elements of masculine order. They posit out, they super-
impose, and they aspire to comprehensiveness and quasi-scientific
neutrality.
Regarding comprehensiveness, codes generally assert that
"each solution to a legal problem must be, directly or indirectly, de-
rived from the text of the code itself."'4 ' This version of order puts
forward a relatively small document to stand in microcosm for a
137. Legrand, supra note 136, at 8. "My true glory is not that I have won 40 battles; Water.
loo will blow away the memory of these victories," Napoleon declared from his exile. "What
nothing will blow away, what will live eternally, is my Civil Code." Oliver Mor6teau, Codes as
Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 273, 278 (1995) (quoting Napoleon).
138. Although the club of codifiers admits no women, codes themselves can be feminine, fol-
lowing the masculine-order pattern of identifying a subject as male and an object as female.
Robert Anthony Pascal, for instance, evokes an aging Southern belle, sullied a bit by rapacious
men over the years:
To speak in metaphor, the shape of Miss Louisiana Civil Code was enough to
make her my mistress. Once I learned of her ancestry and character, I found
her all the more attractive. Tonight I shall try to describe the shape of Miss
Louisiana Civil Code when I first met her and note some of the changes in her
appearance wrought by the attentions of men .... Finally, I shall speculate on
what we may do to heal and rejuvenate her and to teach ourselves to show her
more respect.
Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 302 (1998).
139. Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over the
Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87, 94-95 (1998).
140. Weiss, supra note 131, at 454. I have omitted one item from Weiss' list--"authority" in
the belief that it is common to all legal systems, whereas the other defining elements are par-
ticular to codified systems. Id.
141. Legrand, supra note 136, at 16.
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larger whole.142 The two European codes that serve as precedents to
American restatements establish competing methodologies-stark
simplicity e la mode frangaise versus "complicated terms and ab-
stract concepts" or "the work of scientists" as in the German alter-
native' 43-to achieve a similar comprehensiveness. Whereas French
codifiers looked for "man's nature" as revealed within secular na-
tional law, their German counterparts aspired to build a science of
German national law.' 44 Both types of code aspired to a comprehen-
sive order.14
The codifier posits out by sorting out the big from the small,
the universal from the particular, and denies the disparaged half of
this division a place within the codification. "La rinascita del parti-
colarismo giuridico & incompatibile con l'idea di codificazione,"
gloomily wrote Rodolfo Sacco in 1983, condemning "particularism"
as contrary to the very essence of codification. 46 "Codes today are
grounded in the particular," laments the Canadian comparativist
Patrick Glenn, "and may serve no loftier mission than entry into
the World Trade Organization. We have moved a long way from the
enlightenment."147 To Professor Glenn, newer codes like those of
Quebec, Vietnam, and Russia depart sharply from the codes envi-
sioned in civilian jurisprudence chiefly in that they concern them-
selves with particulars of time and space. 148 These newer codes
themselves practice positing-out; for example, the Russian and
Vietnamese codes deviate sharply from their ancestors by excluding
family law, while "positing in" the subject of intellectual property,
seen as of particular interest to foreign investors.19
As for superimposition, the relationship between codification
and the assertion of a new state recurs throughout history. Among
the commentators on the gendered nature of this phenomenon is
142. See Mario Ascheri, Turning Point in the Ciuil.Law Tradition: From lus Commune to
Code Napoleon, 70 TUL L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1996) (noting development of a code as containing "a
rational structure of technical concepts all related to each other").
143. Mor6teau, supra note 137, at 279.
144. See Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Meltod to Madness: Applying Principles of
Object-Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislatite Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLVY
227, 244-46 (2000).
145. See CSABA VARGA, CODIFICATION AS A SocIo-HISToRIcAL PHENOMENON 112 (Sander
Eszenyi et aL trans., 1991) (noting that even very open textured successors to the French and
German codes, such as the Switzerland codification, see to it that freedoms allotted to judicial
construction and interpretation keep judges within the code).
146. Legrand, supra note 136, at 22 (quoting Rodolfo Sacco, Cadifare: Afodo superato di legif-
erare?, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 117, 119 (1983)).
147. H. Patrick Glenn, The Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 765, 767 (1998).
148. Id. at 766, 782.
149. Id. at 778.
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the Australian political philosopher Carole Pateman who, borrow-
ing a phrase from Francis Bacon, perceives the assertion of a new
civil society as a "masculine birth," or "the appropriation by men of
the awesome gift that nature has denied them and its transmuta-
tion into masculine political creativity." 150 Following a masculine
design that asserts birth-from-no-mother, codifications typically
deny their pasts and invalidate their anterior sources. 151 It is thus
unsurprising that rhetoric about the new republic and its new
needs was central to the formation of the French Civil Code.'5 2
David Dudley Field, who achieved his strongest success when he
formed a code in the nation-like state of California, appealed to
American chauvinism in competition with nations that had used
new codifications to assert their new identities. "Are we inferior to
Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians?"'153 demanded Field in 1886.
Such claims link the order that codification provides with the man-
made artifice of the state, especially the positive law enacted within
its boundaries.
When Field implied that the United States would remain in-
ferior to European nations until it had formed a code of its own, he
proclaimed one of many associations of codification with hierarchy.
To proponents of codification, the completion of a code denotes ma-
turity within a legal system. 154 Pierre Legrand, borrowing a se-
quence from the philosopher Robert Blanch6, claims that codifica-
tion can be seen as the axiomatic stage at which law arrives after
completing "its obligatory passage through its descriptive, induc-
tive, and deductive phases."'15 5 Sharing this view of codification-as-
apex, nineteenth-century proponents of codification in the United
States decreed that the principles amenable to statement in a code
were "higher in rank than deduction or example."'156 One recalls the
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, foil and nemesis to Carol Gilligan,
150. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 102 (1988).
151. Legrand, supra note 136, at 17. Legrand finds this stance "a plain case of cognitive dis.
sonance" because "it is clear that civil codes have borrowed their system, if not their contents,
mainly from the experiences of one of the legal pasts of the legal system they purport to organ-
ize." Id. at 17-18.
152. See Gordley, supra note 135, at 483-84.
153. Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355, 380-81
(1999) (quoting David Dudley Field, Address Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia (Apr. 15,
1886)).
154. See Legrand, supra note 136, at 2 (attributing this view to Max Weber).
155. Id. (citing ROBERT BLANCH9, LUgPISTtMOLOGIE 65 (3d ed. 1983)).
156. Morriss, supra note 153, at 385 (quoting the Civil Code of the State of New York, pt. 1
(1870)). Cases, at best sources of these principles, were "merely so much bran to aid digestion."
Id.
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who placed masculine abstraction at the top of a developmental hi-
erarchy, relegating particularism to nether reaches.157
The relationship between quasi-scientific neutrality and
codification has a long pedigree. Although the common law is not
free of this ambition,158 codifiers aspire especially ardently to sci-
ence. The German Civil Code is famous for evincing this desire, but
American codification history contains its own versions of the ten-
dency. For instance, when California opened its first law school in
1878, this event followed-and was linked to-the enactment of the
California Code,159 "whose civil-code centerpiece conjoined the
state's statutory and common law rules governing private relations
(corporations, property, torts, contracts, and domestic matters) into
one meticulously arranged volume."1 60 At the inaugural address of
the new school, Hastings College of Law, its principal instructor,
John Norton Pomeroy, declared that "California has embodied the
important and controlling doctrines of her jurisprudence in the
form of a scientific code."' 61 Other nineteenth-century American
proponents of codification made similar assertions about codes as
science; 62 the notion endures. 6 3
2. A Prescription of Masculine Order in the General Principles
More than any blackletter or commentary in precedent-
restatements, the Restatements (First) and (Second) of Torts, and
much more than the decisional law on which they rest, the General
Principles contain strong expressions of comprehensiveness, posit-
157. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 409-12 (1981) (situ-
ating the embrace of abstract principles at the highest level of moral development).
158. See NORMAN ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETrIVE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF IBEL 169 (1986) (noting ubiquity of this belief among "the late nineteenth-century
elite").
159. See Grossman, supra note 133, at 617.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting John Norton Pomeroy, The Hastings Law Department of the University of
California: Inaugural Address 10 (1878)).
162. See, e.g., Richard P. Cole, Orthodoxy and Heresy: The Ninetcenth Century History of the
Rule of Law Reconsidered, 32 IND. L. REV. 1335, 1364 (1999) (reviewing DAVID RAY DADE,
HERETICS IN THE TUMBLE (1998)) (stating that one important American proponent of codification,
Thomas Grimke, claimed that "legal science, especially a comprehensive body of code law," made
order out of legal precedents); Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the
Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & Hisr. REv. 421,
440 (1999) (attributing to David Dudley Field the view that law is a science greater even than
astronomy).
163. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 103 (1999) (implying that the concept of codification as science is sound, and
should be revived).
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ing-out, and superimposition. Our review of alternative principles
has shown that such characteristics do not turn up naturally and
inevitably in a recitation of general principles about Torts. They
reflect choices.
Begin with comprehensiveness. In a memorandum to the
Advisers and the Members Consultative Group of the American
Law Institute, Professor Perlman announced a new scope. "Since its
original inception where Gary Schwartz was named sole Reporter,"
Perlman wrote, the General Principles have been "expanded to in-
clude additional provisions that state the basic elements of tort law
generally."'164 Perlman went on to elaborate that the "purpose of this
expansion is to provide a common framework and vocabulary for
the various projects revising the Restatement (Second) of Torts."'16
If this declaration had been written before the final publica-
tion of any portion of the Restatement (Third), it might have been
understood as referring to the alignment that characterizes good
draftsmanship. 166 "Negligence," for instance, should have the same
definition in the section on Products Liability as it has in Appor-
tionment. But Perlman's memorandum appeared after the final ver-
sions of those two sections were published. Any malocclusion of
"framework and vocabulary" inside these published portions of the
Restatement (Third) would just have to be lived with, as Perlman
knew. Readers must take his statement about "expansion," there-
fore, as aspiring to comprehensiveness-order for its own sake, an
abstract ideal, rather than technical accord.
As Perlman goes on to contend, a master-truth unites all the
constituents of tort law: 167
This section [2A, "Basic Elements of a Tort claim,"] has common elements and
principles that apply across a wide range of different harms and regardless of
whether the claim is stated in negligence, intentional conduct, or strict liability
.... Courts have employed a variety of rhetorical formulations .... which often
conceal the universality of the rule stated in this section .... The purpose of this
section is to state the elements common to the imposition of tort liability and to
adopt a verbal formulation of those elements for this Restatement. 16
164. Memorandum from Harvey Perlman to Advisers and Members Consultative Group 1
(May 3, 2000), in Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5.
165. Id.
166. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1150-51 (praising alignment in Restate-
ments).
167. For a contrary view, see Tidmarsh, supra note 72, at 1331 (noting that Oliver Wendell
Holmes had observed that Torts did not begin with a general theory, and has never worked one
out).
168. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2A cmt. a.
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Certainly any document called General Principles reflects a
similar agenda: In order to write this portion of the Restatement, a
Reporter or team of Reporters must seek to isolate the common con-
tent of tort law. All six of my Alternative Principles resulted from a
comparable effort. What distinguishes Perlman's blackletter is his
insistence on a unitary schema. "Basic Elements of a Tort Claim"
purports to characterize the essence of tort law, all of it, in eight
lines and five elements. 169 Whether Perman's list is accurate as a
summary of tort rules has been questioned, 170 but I am less troubled
by the problem of accuracy than by the implication that tort law
will become tidier or more cogent after the publication of his Sec-
tion 2A. Tidier or more cogent for whom? The aspiration to
comprehensiveness that characterizes the prescription of masculine
order often maintains a remote stance away from anyone's needs.
Following this pattern, Section 2A retreats into abstraction, far
from the human experiences that concern tort law.
As for positing-out, a second attribute of masculine order, we
may begin by repeating that restatements as a group, not just the
General Principles, favor this device. "Just as the Newtonian scien-
tist must disregard as aberrational some of the data that descrip-
tive experimentation yields," as Denis Brion writes in his descrip-
tion of Restatements, so too "the legal formalist must discard as ab-
errational some judicial decisions in order to construct a rational
structure in any particular doctrinal area."171 While the game of
positing-out in order to form a unified restatement has stuck many
observers as not worth the candle, 172 a decision to recite General
Principles reflects a contrary view. And so it is unsurprising to see
a preemptive focus on accidentally inflicted physical injury in
Schwartz's share of the General Principles. After allotting his Sec-
tion 1 to defining "intentional" and Section 2 to defining "reckless,"
169. I attended a Members Consultative Group meeting at the ALI on June 10, 2000, where,
according to my notes, Perlman announced that an unprovided section, to be numbered 1, would
define a tort (and thereby limit the criteria laid out in Section 2A, some of which can serve as an
equally accurate description of contract law).
170. For example, Item 1 on Perlman's list of basic elements provides that an actor is subject
in liability in tort for the harm of another if "[t]he actor has a legal obligation, the nature of
which includes protecting the other against harm." Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5. §
2A(1). This reference to "protection" probably misdescribes most types of tort liability. Item 2
adds a requirement that the actor have "breache[d] the legal obligation;" not true with respect to
strict liability, as Gary Schwartz pointed out at the June meeting. Id. § 2A(2).
171. Brion, supra note 75, at 186. Speaking for the Institute, Geoffrey Hazard appears not to
disagree. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, Foreword xi (noting that "the drafting task has
been one of selection by exclusion").
172. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 93, at 1671-77 (summarizing criticisms); Gordley, supra
note 135, at 142 (arguing that clarity and simplicity are not worth pursuing via restatements).
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Schwartz marches straight on toward accidents, never turning
back. The resulting Discussion Draft strongly implies that there is
nothing of interest to be found in intentional torts. Similarly, as
was noted, Schwartz posits out certain kinds of injuries from his
conception of harm.173
The ALI took note of this positing-out when it decided to re-
name Schwartz's General Principles. This retitling acknowledges
that "Torts: General Principles" is a misnomer for a narrow work;
Schwartz's overview of the law of accidentally inflicted physical in-
juries does not address much of Torts. Just as feminists and other
revisionists have shown that the apparently universal is really par-
ticular, the apparently whole really partial, and the apparently
axiomatic worthy of question, 174 the ALI has taken note of positing-
out. By correcting the misnomer of "General Principles," the Insti-
tute commendably has made the device more transparent.
As for superimposition, the ALI assigns each Restatement an
ordinal number upon publication of the first revision. Although
courts do not pay slavish heed to these numbers, sometimes treat-
ing Restatements as non-hierarchical-a First can be as good as a
Third-the preparation of a new Restatement expresses the ALI's
intent to superimpose. The General Principles extend this method
of superimposition by stepping above the particulars that occupy
the Restatements (First) and (Second), which contain no General
Principles sections, to locate bigger and higher truths about tort
law.
Quasi-scientific neutrality, the final aspect of masculine or-
der taken up here, can be found only beneath the surface of the
General Principles, which do not state any desire to achieve the
neutrality and disinterested power associated with science. This
characteristic emerges when one reads the General Principles as a
fraction of the larger Restatement (Third), a conception planned and
executed by the ALI rather than two Torts scholars. Viewed as a
small set designed to form the base for a multitude of assertions,
the General Principles look like the axioms that support knowledge
by deduction. 175 Pure mathematics appears to be the model here. 76
173. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
175. A 1963 text suggests a blueprint for general principles. Pierre Henri van Laer identifies
the characteristics of science as (1) consisting of interrelated facts, principles, laws, and theories
(2) demanding specialization (3) seeking universal statements about commonalities of properties
(4) committed to that which is true or probably true (5) concerned with logical order and (6) able
to explain its investigations and arguments. P.H. VAN LAER, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 8-19 (2d
ed. 1963).
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This subject enjoys a unique prestige, widely envied. 77 Although I
would certainly grant that mathematics and other disciplines can-
not function without their sets of axioms, no such things are inte-
gral to the ALI's Restatements, which have flourished for many dec-
ades without containing anything called General Principles. The
identification of axioms is congruent with a prescription of mascu-
line order.
III. A CONTRARY TRADITION
A. Specifics Within the General Principles
The Schwartz-authored sections of the General Principles
manifest a preference for specifics over grand generalizations. Most
of the sections by Schwartz could easily have been filed under
forthcoming titles of the Restatement (Third) instead of General
Principles; just as the ALI has published a volume called Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, it could prepare volumes
with other subtitles after the colon, such as Strict Liability and
Negligence, using the Schwartz-authored text. Schwartz's Section
14, on statutory compliance, 178 and Section 15, on res ipsa
loquitur, 179 and Section 16, on negligent failure to warn, 180 do not
articulate anything general. They correspond to equally pointed and
measured provisions in the Restatement (Second), blackletter rules
that were never called General Principles. Only the first six sec-
tions in the Schwartz-authored share of the General Principles fit
the masculine-order model of broad, comprehensive declarations
about large portions of tort law. The remaining sections of the Dis-
cussion Draft and the six Schwartz-authored sections of Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 2 are concerned with particulars.
176. See Pure and Sweet, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2000, at 6 (book review) (noting that
"starting from basic assumptions known as axioms, results are proved purely by logical argu-
mene' in mathematics).
177. See, e.g., F. Neil Brady & Gary M. Woller, Administration Ethics and Judgments of Util-
ity: Reconciling the Competing Theories, 26 AM. REV. PUB. ADmtN. 309, 311-15 (1996) (describing
the appeal of a "scientific" theory of public administration incorporating utlitarian values of
efficiency and effectiveness); Mark Parascandola, Epidemiology: Second.Rate Science?, 113 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 312, 315, 319 (1998) (noting that epidemiology, which works with inductive rather
than deductive reasoning, has been disparaged for this departure from the pure-mathematics
ideal).
178. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 14.
179. Id. § 15.
180. Id. § 16.
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Gary Schwartz is not the only particulars-minded author of
the General Principles. Like Schwartz, Harvey Perlman takes up
the subject of negligence per se, 81 a very un-general segment of ac-
cident law. Similarly, Perlman's Section 103 on voluntary under-
takings follows a precise precedent in the free-of-General Principles
Restatement (Second),18 2 as does Section 104 on special relation-
ships as a source of obligation. 183 Although of the two authors
Perlman expresses much more enthusiasm for generalities, his
work product consists mostly of particulars.
These decisions by the Reporters suggest a succumbing to
the lure of specifics, an attraction common to American specialists
in Torts. The lure can be resisted, as may be seen from the codified
tort law of other nations. French and German codifications of tort
law have rejected the particular. The French Civil Code famously
takes up Torts in five short articles, 84 maintaining silence on such
fundamentals as the existence or nature of a fault requirement, the
question of causation, the role of foreseeability, and other questions
that have called for extensive judicial exegesis. 185 The German Civil
Code covers much of Torts in one sentence: "A person who, wilfully
or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom,
property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for
any damage arising therefrom."'86 Scholars can, then, write a Torts
restatement that eschews particulars and specifics. This choice has
been largely rejected in the General Principles.
B. A British Stance
Any survey of the prescription of masculine order as a phe-
nomenon that accompanies codification and much of the civil law
tradition would be incomplete without looking at the most signifi-
181. Id. § 12 (Schwartz's draft); Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 9A (Perlman's
draft).
182. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 103.
183. Id. § 104.
184. Their chapter title is either "Delicts and Quasi-Delicts" or "Of Torts and Quasi-Torts,"
depending on which translation of "Des D61its et des Quasi-D61its" one prefers. Compare ARTHUR
TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 555 (2d ed. 1977)
(using former definition), with Civ. Code [Fr.] 380 (Henry Cachard ed., 1930) (using latter defini-
tion).
185. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 184, at 394-690 (reporting decisional law and
commentary).
186. Section 823 BGB (The German Civil Code of 1900), reprinted in VON MEHREN &
GORDLEY, supra note 184, at 557.
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cant national posture against codification and the civil law. 87
Scholars have long occupied themselves with the British choice to
reject an approach to law that was to win over not only France and
Germany but dozens of other national legal systems. Some have
even tried to explain the British resistance to codification by distin-
guishing Britain from other nations, a feat quite beyond my own
powers. 18s For present purposes we need only note that Britain re-
fused both to create a new national legal code and to receive the
Roman law associated with Justinian, affirming in the process its
commitment to its own common law tradition. The British stance
poses a dissent from the prescription of masculine order.
To be sure, Britain had its great advocates of codification,
notably Francis Bacon and Jeremy Bentham, who sought to clarify
and distill the common law.189 Historians find considerable enthusi-
asm for a national code in the legal writings of Thomas Hobbes,
John Selden, and Matthew Hale. 90 I do not wish to warp history by
isolating Englishmen as unique antagonists to codification and civil
law. Yet a portrait along such lines would contain some consider-
able truth, relevant to this discussion of dissent from the prescrip-
tion of masculine order.
Reading British decisional law in search of relevant expres-
sion, Pierre Legrand finds two noteworthy statements. The first
comes from Lord Macmillan:
[Y]our Lordships are not called on to rationalize the law of England. That attrac-
tive if perilous field may be left to other hands to cultivate.... Arguments based
187. Sociological scholar Csaba Varga argues that the lack of reception of Roman law in
England was the root of noncodification in common law systems around the world. VARGA, supra
note 145, at 159.
188. Varga's explanations, for example, strike me as somewhat tautological. See, e.g., id. at
159-60 (offering various explanations: English "conservatism," a "national conceit" about ancient
and unbroken common law, a national preference for reform over revolution, and an insistence
on practical training). See also Legrand, supra note 136, at 24-25 (noting that Varga ascribes
British noncodification to decentralization, but that decentralization existed also in France and
Germany). For examples of other explanations, see JOHN HENRY MERRYtmNo THE CIV I LAW
TRADITION 17 (1969) (noting that the judiciary in pre-Revolutionary France had been reactionary
and therefore feared by progressives, whereas the British judiciary had been progressive); VON
MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 184, at 12 (summarizing the early development of a national
judicial system in Britain following the Norman conquest).
189. Bentham was nothing less than a fanatic on the subject of codification. See Weiss, su-
pra note 131, at 476-79 (detailing Bentham's efforts, and quoting a historian's assessment that
Bentham was "the greatest codification enthusiast of all times and peoples"). See also id. at 472-
73 (recounting Bacon's efforts); id. at 480-81 (describing John Austin's concept of codification); id.
at 482 (listing nineteenth-century British advocates).
190. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV- The Nature of Ciuilian
Influence on Modern Anglo-American Commercial Law, 67 B.U. L. REV. 877, 925-34 (1987) (pro-
viding an overview of the perspectives and writings of all these authors).
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on consistency are apt to mislead for the common law is a practical code adapted to
deal with the manifold diversities of human life .... 191
The second of Legrand's quotations comes from Lord Griffiths, who
noted that
the common law of England has not always developed upon strictly logical lines,
and where logic leads down a path that is beset by practical difficulties that courts
have not been frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution that will
best serve the needs of society. 192
A meticulous writer might sort out the various strands here,
recognizing that empiricist stances in Britain, the common law tra-
dition, hostility to codification, and the absence of receiving Roman
law are all district phenomena, each one not logically or necessarily
requiring any of the others. 193 Again, however, our present purposes
are simple. Under the rubric of a British stance, we see something
resembling order in a feminine sense. Compared to a civil law, the
common law is an accretion of fact-specific rules, each of them "in-
trinsically narrower than even the most detailed legal precept
found in any statute or code."1 94 Compared to his counterpart on the
Continent, writes Tony Weir (an accomplished translator of Ger-
man and French writings about the law), an English lawyer is
"more concerned with result than method, function than shape, ef-
fectiveness than style: he has little talent for producing intellectual
order and little interest in the finer points of taxonomy."'195
Of all the scholars who have expressed this British stance,
one may deserve particular mention here. More fundamentally than
any other writer, Sir Edward Coke equated law with its profession-
als: a well-trained, reasoning judge, aided by lawyers who lay the
groundwork for judicial decisions. 96 Consistent with his written
views, Coke looked James I in the eye, bravely telling the King that
as a nonlawyer he was incompetent to adjudicate; the civil law tra-
dition, in contrast to Coke's view, has applauded national codes
(particularly the French Civil Code) for their accessibility to lay-
men. Coke's rivalry with Francis Bacon, though multifaceted, can
be seen as another illustration of the dichotomy: one man an advo-
cate of keeping power in the hands of judges and lawyers, the other
191. Legrand, supra note 136, at 25 (citing Read v. J. Lyons & Co., 156 A.C. 175 (H.L. 1947)).
192. Id. (quoting Regina v. Deputy Governor of Camphill Prison, 735 Q.B. 751 (C.A. 1998)).
193. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 438-39.
194. Cappalli, supra note 139, at 99.
195. See Legrand, supra note 136, at 25 (quoting Tony Weir, The Common Law Systent, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2 (Ren6 David ed., 1971)).
196. See Allen Dillard Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and Will". Sir Edward Coke and
the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 48-58 (1997).
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an ambitious prot6g6 of James who sought to write the laws of
England into codifications. 197
Like other traditions surveyed in this Essay, the British
stance continues to flourish. One exemplar of the stance is the Aus-
tralian scholar of private law and Wade conference participant Jane
Stapleton. Stapleton's ventures at improving products liability law,
as well as private law generally, address particulars.193 When
Stapleton explores a big topic, such as causation in fact, she keeps
the general principles to a minimum; her analysis dissects and mi-
cro-divides rather than synthesizes. 199 Although the ever-tightening
integration of Britain into the European Union and other European
entities may limit British exceptionalism in the future, the tradi-
tion continues to state a powerful alternative to the prescription of
masculine order.
C. Jurisprudential Assessments of the Judge
Although a few assessments of the role of a common-law
judge ascribe masculinity to this figure,200 within jurisprudence the
judge often signifies order in a contrasting or feminine sense. Clas-
sifying their writings variously under "dynamic statutory interpre-
tation,"2 01 the common law method,20 2 "the nature of the judicial
process,"203 the "common law in the age of statutes,"201 pragmatism
197. See Barbara Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century England, 1974
VIS. L. REV. 428, 438-45 (describing Bacon's agenda); VARGA, supra note 145, at 146.47 (de-
scribing resistance to Bacon's efforts). Allen Boyer notes the theme of gender in the lives of Ba-
con and Coke: "[O]f the two women who ever had to choose directly between Bacon and Coke--
Queen Elizabeth, choosing an attorney general, and Lady Elizabeth Hatton, choosing a
husband-both chose Coke." Allen D. Boyer, Light, Shadow, Science, and Law, 92 MICH. L REV.
1622, 1633-34 (1994) (book review). I am grateful to Ben Zipursky and John Goldberg for
reminding me of the Coke-Bacon rivalry and pointing out its relation to this Essay.
198. Five years ago I had occasion in this publication to study Stapleton's text on products li-
ability law, published around the same time as the earliest portion of the Restatement (Third).
See Bernstein, supra note 93 (reviewing JANE STAPLErON, PRODUCT LIABILITY (1994)). Staple-
ton's major insight in Product Liability was that the entire category of products liability asserts a
false coherence. According to Stapleton, a true restatement of products liability cannot be writ-
ten because the boundaries of the doctrine are unstable. Id. at 1691-92.
199. See generally Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001).
200. See Karen Busby, The Maleness of Legal Language, 18 MANITOBA LJ. 191, 203 (1989)
(faulting Ronald Dworkin for naming his ideal judge Hercules when Greek mythology already
contained a judge, the female Athena; in Greek lore "Hercules" stands for characteristics other
than judicial virtue); Resnik, supra note 122, at 948-53, 956-64 (associating the Article HI judge
with masculine authority).
201. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION4 (1994).
202. See generally Cappalli, supra note 139.
203. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
204. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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or practical reason in the judicial context, 205 inductive reasoning,20
judicial review, 20 7 procedural justice,208 substantive due process, 20 9
or a host of other rubrics, an array of scholars in the late twentieth
century built an enormous literature that lines up more or less with
what I have called dissent from the prescription of masculine
order.210 Because the common-law judge often takes center stage in
these writings, we can use this construct to explore the common
theme of "order in the feminine sense" that unites them.
This jurisprudence regards the judge as having a chance to
achieve wisdom or even heroism through the work of
adjudication. 21' It admits that biases, errors, and misplaced heuris-
tics often cause the judge to fail. Political obstacles can negate judi-
cial achievements. Unjust rules about access will in any case keep
meritorious complaints out of the docket. Furthermore, not every
controversy belongs in the judge's court. Notwithstanding these and
other infirmities, writers celebrate the common-law judge for his
power and potential-a force denied to the judiciary in (pure or
strict versions of) the civil law system, as well as in legal systems
that do not foster a mature and independent bench.
Standing at the center of the common law, the judge eschews
various aspects of masculine order. Consider several players and
elements from the jurisprudential literature. In contrast to the ci-
vilian and code-related trait of completeness, Edward Coke--"the
205. See Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 494, 495-96 (1991) (book review) (referring to "the current wave of practical reason, prag-
matism, or common sense" as approaches to the problem ofjudicial decision-making).
206. See JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 37
(1995) (associating inductive reasoning with the common law method).
207. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
208. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2 (1979)
(using the rubrics of procedure and procedural justice to cover a variety of topics pertaining to
judicial power); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375, 379-80 (1992) (arguing that the Civil Justice Reform Act arrogates to Congress power
that ought to be held by federal judges).
209. See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 943-48,
987-99 (using originalism to argue that judges have the power to protect individuals from en-
croachment by the federal government).
210. Without praising "feminine order," or condemning "masculine order," as such, John
Goldberg describes Cardozo as a judge and legal theorist who expresses the feminine half of the
dichotomy. Cardozo regarded the sources of the common law as fluid and pluralistic; norms,
"neither fully shared nor static," work together with precedent to determine the outcomes of
cases. John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Restructuring Car-
dozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1327 (1990).
211. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 243-61, 354 (1986).
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paradigm of the independent judge"212 -was notoriously unreliable
when he tried to declare the content of English law,213 and contra-
dictory on the question of whether new statutes made new law.21 4
Similarly William Eskridge denies that the content of a statute is
fixed at publication;215 it would follow that all compendia, at least
those in the United States, are by definition never complete. 216 Lon
Fuller's contention that the common law consists of a combination
of "reason and fiat" posits a past (expressed as precedent) that
works with a present and future elaboration of the law;217 here
again, completeness remains metaphysically elusive.
The notion of "system," associated with German legal sci-
ence,218 can describe the common law contrast only if the word is
interpreted laxly: A common-law judge is a constituent of a system,
to be sure, but this person does not work within "an elaborated,
complex system" set up for "strict logical-axiomatic deduction."219
Similarly, reform may be present in this judge's world, but the
common law tradition, having proceeded by increments, lacks the
element of sweeping jettison that has characterized the common-
law alternative. 220 The common-law judge finds order in facts, de-
tails, particulars, and other small units, rather than general princi-
ples.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary of tort law that Gary Schwartz and Harvey
Perman presented in the first publications of Restatement (Third)
of Torts: General Principles offers considerable gratification to the
Torts community. Our ragged subject, notorious for lacking a clear
212. Boyer, supra note 196, at 45. See also Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1, 62 (2000) (noting that whereas the British perspective on Coke's insights juxta-
posed the judge against the king and thereby permitted Parliamentary supremacy, in the United
States Coke was read to have celebrated the judiciary as a bulwark against legislative as well as
executive encroachment).
213. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence" Coke, Selden, Hale, 103
YALE L.J. 1651, 1678-94 (1994) (noting uncertain role of custom in Coke's jurisprudence).
214. See GLENN BURGESS, THE PoLrrIcs OF THE ANcIENT CONSTITUTION 27 (1993) (claiming
that Coke described the role of statutes "half-heartedly and with a notable lack of success").
215. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 201, at 199.
216. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 517 (asserting that the United States Code is "a mere
compendium" because it lacks "sophisticated systematic ambition").
217. Lon L Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L REV. 376, 391-95 (1946).
218. See Blackwell, supra note 144, at 245.
219. Weiss, supra note 131, at 464.
220. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF .AMERICAN LAW 90 (2d ed. 1985) (asserting
the inverse, "any fresh start demands codification").
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definition of what it covers, younger and less elegant than other
categories of the common law, seldom able to deliver on its big
promises (compensation, deterrence, corrective justice, allocative
efficiency), eternally flawed and improvised, certainly cries out to
be put in order. Despite my conclusion that this order will remain
elusive, I nevertheless applaud the masterful effort in the General
Principles to create stability and systemization.
In this Essay, I have associated the General Principles with
other great restatements, especially the codifications associated
with the civil law. Anglo-American law and lawyers are much en-
riched by this basis for comparison with the common law tradition,
even if they are not entirely conscious of how codification has influ-
enced their own legal system. 221 By linking the General Principles
with such "restatements" as the Articles pertaining to "delicts and
quasi-delicts" in the French Civil Code,222 I intend to express both
admiration and caution. I admire the ambition to distill the essence
of American tort law into a short volume, the breadth of scholarly
knowledge that Gary Schwartz and Harvey Perlman bring to the
project and convey separately in their portions of the General Prin-
ciples and, perhaps most of all, the audacious presentation of a big
subject. My sense of caution derives from these very characteristics:
Big comprehensive treatments are smaller and more particular
than they strive to be. Any grand, overarching, comprehensive de-
scription will omit various truths.
The omissions of the General Principles may be seen through
different devices, some of which I have noted in this Essay. A set of
Alternative Principles, for example, suggests that the General Prin-
ciples leave out several descriptive assertions about American tort
law; because these Alternative Principles would help to fulfill the
American Law Institute's goals of reconciliation and reform, their
exclusion raises questions about the completeness of the General
Principles. A summary of what I have called order in the feminine
sense returns to the same theme by different means. This approach
finds tort law united in its separate increments rather than its gen-
eralities. Common-law adjudication offers yet another way to look
at the phenomeon. By tradition the common law emphasizes vari-
able conditions-the judge, the lawyers, the facts, traditions of rea-
soning, norms, social conditions-rather than an unvarying larger
221. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 437 n.3 (noting that the influence of codification on the
civil law "has been neglected" in legal scholarship).
222. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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system, or what I have called the prescription of masculine order.22
Although the solutions, methods, and taxonomies of masculine or-
der built the ALI's first document titled, and other grand struc-
tures, these constructs will always be partial.24
223. Lance Liebman spoke to me of the need to understand the law of colliding with a
chicken in the road. Other legal systems and approaches to the law may look to a jurisprudence
of encounters or collisions, he said, but "we say you've got to start with the chicken." Telephone
Conversation with Lance Liebman, Director, American Law Institute (Dec. 20, 2000).
224. Admirers of feminine order will understand that the word "partialr is not in the least
pejorative. See HARAWAY, supra note 126, at 190 C([O]nly partial perspective promises objective
vision.").

